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Restorative Justice, Consistency and Proportionality: examining the trade-
off 
Dr Elizabeth Tiarks 
Restorative justice conferences which operate as sentencing mechanisms involve the 
making of a trade-off. This is between empowering lay participants to make their own 
decisions, and the requirements of consistency and proportionality, which are 
established principles of sentencing. In current restorative justice practice, this trade-off 
tends to be made more in favour of consistency and proportionality, at the expense of 
the empowerment of lay participants. 
Empowerment is central to key benefits of restorative justice, such as reducing 
recidivism and increasing victim satisfaction. However, its importance to the 
effectiveness of restorative justice is not always properly acknowledged. In addition to 
this, there are both conceptual and practical problems with the principles of consistency 
and proportionality (particularly in the way that they are presented when considered in 
relation to restorative justice) which are often overlooked. As a result, the tendency is 
for assumptions to be made about the necessary supremacy of these principles over 
empowerment. 
This paper urges more acknowledgement of the importance of empowerment in 
restorative justice, together with a greater appreciation of the problems with 
consistency and proportionality, with a view to challenging assumptions about the way 
that the trade-off must be made. 
Keywords: sentencing; punishment; restorative justice; proportionality; consistency; 
empowerment. 
 
Restorative Justice and the importance of empowerment 
A trade-off occurs in restorative justice (“RJ”) conferencing which is used to help determine 
sentence. This is between the empowerment of lay participants, a key goal for RJ, and the 
established sentencing principles of proportionality and consistency. Insufficient attention has 
been paid to the problems with proportionality and consistency and this has led to state-run 
RJ tending to undermine empowerment in favour of these principles. The trade-off is thus 
currently made without full understanding of proportionality and consistency and this has 
resulted in the favouring of these principles at the expense of empowerment. 
 
RJ has become widespread in many areas, including criminal justice. The focus here 
is on state-run RJ conferencing1 when used post-conviction as an alternative sentencing 
mechanism. Such RJ conferences are used in various jurisdictions, including New Zealand 
and Northern Ireland (discussed in more detail below). These types of RJ conferences draw 
on Tony Marshall’s definition: “restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a 
stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future”.2 This emphasises the 
empowerment of lay individuals as key decision-makers in the process. 
 
A RJ conference takes place once guilt has been accepted by the offender and only if 
the parties voluntarily agree to participate. It brings together the victim, offender and others 
affected by the offence, including community and family members. The conference is 
facilitated by a trained coordinator who ensures that everybody has an opportunity to speak 
about the offence and the circumstances surrounding the offending behaviour. The 
conference operates as a sentencing mechanism: participants can agree on what the offender 
should be subject to as a result of the offending behaviour. The agreement must be 
consensual, with all relevant parties, including the victim and offender, in agreement for this 
plan to be finalised.3 
 
Unlike traditional sentencing, RJ lets lay participants act as key decision-makers. This 
reflects debates about the ownership of justice and the role of the state in the resolution of 
conflicts which informed the development of RJ. For example, Nils Christie argues that the 
state tends to “steal” the conflict from stakeholders - the victim, offender and affected 
community - and that this should be restored to them. He highlights the importance of those 
most affected retaining control of decision-making, and downplays the significance of the 
content of the decision: 
 
Except for execution, castration or incarceration for life, no measure has a 
proven minimum efficiency compared to any other measure. We might as 
well react to crime according to what closely involved parties find is just 
and in accordance with general values in society.4 
 
Whilst Christie’s work did not expressly address RJ, it has influenced RJ theorists, 
including Barton,5 whose “empowerment model” maintains that the strength of RJ is  its 
ability to engage key stakeholders in decision-making rather than pursuing a particular 
outcome. Like Christie, Barton holds that a fundamental problem with the current criminal 
justice system is its disempowerment of key stakeholders6 and the most critical feature of RJ 
is its ability to address this problem and empower stakeholders “who are best placed to 
address both the causes and the consequences of the unacceptable behaviour in question”.7 
 
Similarly, Dzur and Olson argue that the traditional criminal justice process leads to 
the way the offence is dealt with becoming “more abstracted, more alienated from the actual 
experiences of victim, offender, and community”8 and have argued for something akin to 
Christie’s restoration of the conflict to the stakeholders. In terms of who “stakeholders” are, the 
well-known model proposed by McCold and Wachtel divides participants into direct and 
indirect stakeholders.9 Victims, offenders and family members are direct stakeholders; whereas 
community members and wider society are indirect stakeholders. Whilst indirect stakeholders should 
support RJ processes, direct stakeholders should determine the outcome of the case: “[t]hese 
indirect stakeholders have a responsibility to support and facilitate processes in which the direct 
stakeholders determine for themselves the outcome of the case”.10 This has implications for the 
role of the state in relation to RJ, which will be discussed further, below. 
 
The importance of direct stakeholders having control in determining the outcome is 
highlighted in the empowerment theory proposed by O’Mahony and Doak, which emphasises 
agency and accountability11 in RJ. They point out the benefits of participants who lack 
control in their lives being able to gain some kind of control through participation in 
decisions that impact them and argue that the result can be a change in their states of mind, 
lasting beyond the conference.12 The benefits of empowerment are outlined in more detail 
below and whilst considerable, they work uneasily with the application of the established 
sentencing principles of consistency and proportionality. 
 
The concern is that the more lay participants are empowered to make their own 
decisions, the greater the risk of undermining consistency and proportionality, due to 
increased variability in the decision-making process. These are significant concerns, as 
consistency and proportionality are widely held to be important – even central – to sentencing 
policy and practice. For example, one of the aims of the Sentencing Council in England and 
Wales (which produces detailed guidelines on sentencing, which courts must follow13), is to 
increase consistency in sentencing14 and guidance to sentencers emphasises proportionality. 
The principles of proportionality and consistency are usually implemented by placing 
restrictions on judicial discretion, through the introduction of statutory minimum and 
maximum penalties; sentencing guidelines; and other miscellaneous sentencing legislation 
and policy. 
 
Proportionality has been defined by Von Hirsch as the principle that “penalties be 
proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the defendant's criminal conduct”, and this 
“seems to be a basic requirement of fairness”.15 This reflects general sentiment about the 
concept of proportionality and, alongside consistency, it is heavily linked to notions of justice 
and fairness in sentencing. In relation to consistency, Von Hirsch and Ashworth state: 
“[s]entence inequality sacrifices an important value of justice”.16 Consistency in sentencing is 
the idea that “similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances would 
be expected to receive similar sentencing outcomes”,17 or as more commonly put: like cases 
should be treated alike. 
 
The importance of these principles in sentencing might stem from their connection to 
rule of law considerations of preventing arbitrariness and ensuring equality before the law.18 
The rule of law is by no means a settled concept, as remarked on by Lord Bingham: “well-
respected authors have thrown doubt on its meaning and value”,19 it even being suggested by 
some to have been rendered a political tool and almost meaningless.20 Despite such 
criticisms, there is general acceptance of the importance of the rule of law and hence 
proportionality and consistency as important in upholding it. It is worth noting, however, that 
such rule of law ideals are capable of interpretation in line with empowering restorative 
justice conferences, which can guard against arbitrariness and ensure equality before the law 
through pursuit of procedural justice21  (discussed further below in the section on the wider 
context). The contested nature of the rule of law provides room for such adaptations to more 
conventional modes of conceptualising the pursuit of these safeguards. 
 
The continued importance of proportionality and consistency in sentencing may also 
be linked to their role in reducing cases to particular categories and types, to increase 
measurability. This can be viewed as useful for increasing the efficiency of processing cases, 
as well as budgeting for prison places, rehabilitative courses (such as drug treatment) and so 
forth. It has been argued, for example by Scott, that states have a tendency towards such 
simplification and standardisation of complex matters.22 Whilst potentially useful, Scott notes 
that such state tendencies can also be detrimental, as they usually occur at the expense of 
important context: “We have repeatedly observed the natural and social failures of thin, 
formulaic simplifications imposed through the agency of state power …”.23 Such concerns 
are reflected in some of the criticisms of consistency and proportionality addressed later in 
this paper. 
 
A full exploration of the reasons for the perpetuation of consistency and 
proportionality as important ideals in sentencing is outside the scope of this paper, but their 
widely accepted importance is noteworthy and their role in relation to RJ is important to 
consider. This helps to explain the substantial weight given to criticisms of RJ which suggest 
that the empowerment of lay participants can undermine proportionality and consistency. 24 
Consistency and proportionality are not, however, as straightforward, necessarily beneficial 
or philosophically and politically neutral, as is sometimes assumed, as discussed further 
below. It is not suggested that these principles be disregarded altogether, but that their 
shortcomings should be acknowledged when considering how these principles are applied in 
relation to RJ and particularly in how the balance is to be struck between empowerment of 
individuals, versus pursuance of these principles. 
 
Trade-Off 
RJ conferences involve a trade-off between consistency and proportionality on one hand, and 
the empowerment of participants on the other. Currently, the trade-off tends to favour 
proportionality and consistency at the expense of empowerment. This is unsurprising given 
they are long-standing principles embedded in many sentencing systems, whereas the 
empowerment of lay participants is largely foreign to traditional methods of sentencing. The 
centrality of proportionality and consistency to conceptions of sentencing and delivering 
justice is such that even many proponents of RJ prioritise proportionality and consistency 
over empowerment and so suggest various measures to uphold these principles,25, as 
discussed in more detail below.  
 
The New Zealand case of R v Clotworthy26 demonstrates the way in which 
empowerment is subordinated to proportionality and consistency. The offender had slashed 
the victim with a knife causing injuries to the victim’s face, chest and stomach, which 
required surgery and left permanent scarring. The offender pleaded guilty and sentencing was 
suspended whilst a RJ conference took place. During the conference, the offender was 
remorseful and the victim accepted his apology. It was agreed between them that the offender 
would pay a large sum of money towards the victim’s cosmetic surgery for the scarring. The 
victim was opposed to the offender going to prison. 
 
In the District Court, Judge Thorburn incorporated the views expressed in the RJ 
conference into his decision-making, imposing a suspended sentence, meaning the offender 
did not go to custody and could pay the agreed amount. However, when the matter was 
appealed, the Court of Appeal imposed an immediate sentence of imprisonment, prioritising 
state notions of proportionality over the parties’ wishes.  Therefore, the offender could not 
work and the victim did not receive the payment, meaning that he did not receive the required 
surgery. The trade-off between proportionality and empowerment in this case thus favoured 
proportionality. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Clotworthy may strike one as either deeply unfair, 
or entirely proper. The reaction one has to this case is probably a reasonable indicator of 
where one considers the trade-off should be made between proportionality and consistency; 
and empowerment. This paper aims to encourage proper consideration of the benefits of 
empowerment in RJ, a more developed understanding of both proportionality and 
consistency, and ultimately to encourage the favouring of empowerment more than is 
currently seen in most state-run RJ. Whilst empowerment has been considered in the RJ 
literature in some detail, the problems with the principles of proportionality and consistency 
have been somewhat neglected.  
 
The next section summarises the key benefits of empowerment, after which the 
problems with proportionality and consistency are explored. This will then be examined in 
relation to RJ practice and the tendency of states to over-emphasise proportionality and 
consistency and in doing so undermine empowerment. Here, the wider context within which 
these principles are employed highlights further issues, particularly in respect of 
proportionality. The social and political context within which proportionality operates tends 
to mean its co-option as a tool for increasing punitiveness, rather than as a limiting 
mechanism, as is usually assumed in RJ debates. 
 
Empowerment 
As outlined above, empowerment is central to RJ, which promises to deliver decision-making 
power into the hands of lay participants. As noted by O’Mahony and Doak, empowering RJ 
processes can provide for a sense of ownership of the process and democratic participation in 
justice, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the proceedings.27 Relatedly, RJ can also 
increase penal legitimacy by aligning stakeholders’ understandings of justice with resulting 
sentences.28 This is particularly important in light of current concerns about penal legitimacy, 
with some authors referring to the existence of a “penal crisis”.29  
 
Empowerment also contributes to reducing reoffending rates. Following a detailed review of 
the available evidence on the link between RJ and its effectiveness at reducing recidivism, 
O’Mahony and Doak found that active involvement in the RJ process, including feeling 
ownership over the process and being involved in consensual decision-making,30 were key 
factors in reducing reoffending rates.31 It has also been demonstrated that empowering RJ 
processes increases victim satisfaction.32 33 34 For victims, recognition as a key stakeholder 
and involvement in decision-making processes can help them regain a sense of autonomy and 
control which, as mentioned above, can resonate beyond the conference itself.35 This is 
important following the often severely disempowering effects of crime36 and accords with 
other findings about the benefits of victim involvement and dissatisfaction experienced by 
victims who feel disempowered through lack of involvement or insufficient consultation 
about the outcome. 37 
 
Increasing legitimacy, increasing victim satisfaction and reducing recidivism are all 
important benefits of RJ which stem from empowerment. This is perhaps why empowerment 
has been considered the “fundamental starting point of restorative justice”.38 A related and 
considerable benefit of empowering RJ processes is the potential for a reduction in the use of 
imprisonment. It could help tackle increasing prison populations, and resulting capacity 
issues and rising costs. Overcrowding in prisons adversely impacts prisoners’ physical and 
mental health, as well as leading to unsafe working conditions for prison staff.39 The prison 
population in England and Wales quadrupled between 1900 and 2017 (with the sharpest 
increase from 1990) and prison sentences were longer in 2018 than they were in 2010.40 
There are projected further increases in the prison population,41 meaning there is no 
indication of the problem resolving over time without a significant change in approach. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that RJ participants tend to be less punitive.42 This is 
perhaps because RJ allows for more information about the offence and the circumstances to 
be considered, which links with other findings about public attitudes to sentencing: that, 
where individuals have more detail individuals have about a particular crime, their responses 
become more nuanced and less punitive. RJ might thus encourage less punitive ways of 
dealing with offenders and  more limited use of imprisonment. 
 
The potential of empowerment through RJ considerable. It is therefore crucial to 
understand the benefits of empowerment when considering whether to trade if off against 
proportionality and consistency. Equally, one must consider the less well-acknowledged 
problems with consistency and proportionality. 
 
Consistency and Proportionality 
Problems with consistency 
The problems with consistency can be divided up into conceptual problems and practical 
problems. A key conceptual difficulty lies in determining which factors should be taken into 
account when deciding what makes cases similar or different. For example, consider two 
hypothetical cases of theft: Case A and Case B. On a simplistic level, they are similar because 
the same offence has been charged, and a crude interpretation of the consistency principle 
might be that each offender should receive the same punishment. However, most systems are 
more nuanced than that and take into account certain features of the offence and offenders. 
Suppose Case A involves theft of expensive diamond jewellery; whereas Case B involves 
theft of a sandwich. The former might be the result of months of planning; whereas the latter 
might have been a spur of the moment theft, motivated by hunger. The characteristics of the 
respective offenders might also differ. Perhaps Offender A is only 15 and has been influenced 
by an older family member to carry out the theft; maybe Offender B is in her 70s and 
homeless, and is a chronic alcoholic. These are factors which might be taken into account in 
deciding whether the two cases are similar or differ. 
 
The nuances of each case can be many: “sentencing as currently practised is an 
unavoidably value-laden process … reflecting the fact that the court process as a whole … 
centres on the complex human stories of the accused and those affected, as much as on the 
law.”43 There are therefore value judgments to be made in deciding the factors which “count” 
in determining whether cases are alike. This judgment having been made, consideration must 
be given to what difference each factor should make to sentence: which factors should be 
treated as aggravating, which should be treated as mitigating and which will not affect 
sentence at all. For example: intoxication; addiction; and social background can be treated as 
both aggravating and mitigating – or make no difference to sentence.44 Once a factor has 
been evaluated as either aggravating or mitigating, there remains the question of the extent to 
which it should reduce or increase the severity of sentence –  further value judgments. 
 
Consistency also experiences practical difficulties in obtaining complete and objective 
information about a case. Sentencers have limited information on which to base their 
assessment of what a case is like, so meaningful comparisons of cases are necessarily limited 
at the outset, even aside from the conceptual issues raised above. Sentencers have particularly 
limited information available to them where there has been a guilty plea – and depending on 
the jurisdiction, this can be the majority of cases. For example, 67% of Crown Court cases in 
England and Wales resulted in a guilty plea in 2017 (the lowest guilty plea rate since 2006).45 
 
To illustrate how limited the information given to judges and magistrates can be, it is 
useful to consider sentencing procedure. In many jurisdictions, including England and Wales, 
the prosecutor summarises the offence and then the defence advocate mitigates on behalf of 
the defendant, before the court decides on sentence. Ideally, plenty of time has been made 
available for prosecution and defence advocates to familiarise themselves with the case and 
their clients or witnesses, the defendant is a wonderful communicator and arrives at court in 
plenty of time to consult with his or her advocate, and unlimited time is allowed in court for 
the case to be heard and considered. The reality is often quite different. The prosecution and 
defence representations to the court can be short – as little as a few minutes long in more 
straightforward cases. The prosecutor might only have received papers for the case that 
morning and not have met any of the witnesses. Likewise, the defence advocate might have 
spoken to the defendant for the first time shortly before the hearing and had little chance to 
find out about their personal circumstances – possibly because the client was late to court, but 
perhaps also because the client may have difficulty communicating.46 There may also be 
pressures on the court to get through cases as quickly as possible. In addition to hearing 
representations, sentencers will sometimes also be given a pre-sentence report to assist the 
decision-making process, which might be afforded more or less weight, depending on the 
disposition of the sentencer.47 
 
Even in the ideal scenario outlined above, the information available to sentencers will 
be limited. Neither advocate has full knowledge of what offending behaviour actually 
occurred, as they will not have been present at the time of the offence. Finally, many guilty 
pleas are the product of negotiation between prosecution and defence advocates,48 which 
sometimes focus more on likely sentencing outcomes than getting to the truth of the matter. 
 
These practical problems are important to consider, as arguments for increasing 
consistency in sentencing are often centred on limiting judicial discretion and improving the 
strength of sentencing guidelines. This may in fact further reduce the capacity for like cases 
to be identified and treated alike, particularly at the more extreme end of attempts to increase 
consistency through stricter guidelines: grid-style sentencing. Such guidelines take the form 
of a two-axis grid.49 Along one axis is offence seriousness; and along the other axis is 
criminal history. The sentencer follows across and down the grid to find the recommended 
sentence for the offender, thus removing much contextual information from the decision-
making process, with the aim of increased consistency. The result, however, can be self-
defeating, as pointed out by Tonry:  
 
[the two-axis grid] produces unjust results and conduces to needlessly harsh 
sentences. … in the interest of treating like cases alike, they lead to 
disregard of other ethically relevant differences between offenders – like 
their personal backgrounds and the effects of punishments on them and 
their families – and thereby often treat unlike cases alike. 50 
 
Ultimately, the facts on which an offender is sentenced are highly unlikely to be 
equivalent to the offending behaviour. Even the most perfected balance between discretion 
and guidelines can at best only provide an approximation of consistency. This undermines the 
idea of consistency as it is conceptualised in RJ debates – as a tool for ensuring equal 
offenders are treated equally. Where consistency is pursued, it is not like cases being treated 
alike, it is one rough approximation of what probably happened aligned with another, with 
equivalence determined by a few select features of those cases. The comparison of cases is 
not therefore the same thing as a comparison of actual offending behaviour. 
 
Problems with proportionality 
Proportionality calculations in sentencing are often imagined as simple, mathematical and 
objective, and this is particularly the case in literature which is critical of RJ on the basis of 
its alleged failure to uphold proportionality.51 Weighing proportionality is, in fact, a deeply 
subjective assessment. Calculating proportionality involves evaluating how serious the 
offence is (usually by assessing harm and culpability); and deciding what punishment equates 
to that level of seriousness. 
 
These issues can be approached in a variety of ways. Assessing culpability involves 
the same subjectivity as has been highlighted in relation to consistency above, such as 
determining how much more or less culpable one should hold an intoxicated offender to be. 
Assessing harm also involves subjectivity in deciding what constitutes harm and what the 
level of harm is. Calculating harm is particularly problematic for inchoate crimes, such as 
attempted rape,52 with some theorists arguing that inchoate crimes should be considered less 
serious than completed offences;53 and others disputing this approach.54 Evaluation of these 
different conceptualisations of the level of harm to attribute to inchoate crimes is outside the 
scope of this paper, but the diversity of approaches demonstrates the plurality of views which 
exist surrounding harm calculations. This is also shown by the existence of different systems 
for measuring harm. 
 
Two prominent and differing theories for assessing harm are Von Hirsch and 
Jareborg’s living standard; and Feinberg’s choice-based standard. The living standard 
analysis involves ranking harms according to how they typically reduce or restrict a person's 
means or capability for achieving a particular standard of living (including both economic 
and non-economic interests). Von Hirsch and Jareborg expressly pit themselves against 
Feinberg, whose choice-based standard assesses the harm done by reference to the extent that 
victims’ choices are limited as a result of the offence, e.g. physical incapacitation limiting a 
large number of life choices. It might be that one or the other of these views is more 
persuasive, but these opposing views are still suggestive of the subjective nature of 
proportionality calculations. 
 
Once harm and culpability have been assessed, there is then the issue – highlighted by 
Hart – of how harm and culpability can meaningfully be combined to produce a single 
evaluation of seriousness: “it is not clear what … is to be the measure of 'seriousness'. Is 
negligently causing the destruction of a city worse than the intentional wounding of a single 
policeman?”.55 Depending on the individual weighting of culpability and harm, radically 
different assessments of seriousness for these two hypothetical cases are possible. The 
subjectivity inherent in assessments of harm; culpability; and how these two assessments 
should be combined, undermines the current simplistic conceptualisation of proportionality 
when used as an argument against empowerment in RJ. 
 
After the above assessments have been made and the seriousness of the offence has 
been decided upon, it remains necessary to match offence seriousness with a relevant 
punishment. Von Hirsch has suggested ranking offences on a sliding scale in order of gravity, 
and penalties in order of severity, then matching these two scales up. Here a further issue 
arises: to what extent should the subjective experience of punishment be taken into account? 
Whether subjective experience is factored in or not will alter the scale – potentially radically. 
If the aim is proportionality that is in some sense “true” or “right”, then it should follow that 
the proportional punishment of the offender will take into account the subjective experience 
of the offender, in receiving that punishment. 
 
There are problems with factoring in subjective experience, however, and not just 
because it is likely to be difficult to predict. Kolber highlights the problem of undesirable 
outcomes, where subjective punishment is prioritised: that actual proportionality may not be 
as intuitively desirable as it is often assumed to be. He argues that equating severity of prison 
sentence with its length amounts to a “duration fetish” and points out that “sentence severity 
also depends on other prison hardships”.56 He goes on to suggest that it is reasonable to 
assume that a rich person who has started from a baseline of a plush lifestyle will suffer more 
(in terms of deprivation, economic loss, etc.) than a poor person starting from a worse 
baseline. Therefore, if the rich and poor person were to be sentenced for the same crime and 
both are to suffer the same amount of proportional harsh treatment, then the rich person 
should – argues Kolber – receive a shorter sentence. This may not be a particularly inviting 
conclusion and is worth considering in relation to oft-stated objectives of proportionality, 
such as equal treatment of offenders and the limiting of discrimination. 
 
In summary, what is considered proportional can vary substantially, and it is 
extremely difficult – perhaps impossible – to identify an objective standard of proportionality 
by which cases can be assessed. Likewise, there are conceptual and practical problems with 
the principle of consistency, as outlined above. The problems with these principles should 
affect the trade-off between the empowerment of participants in RJ conferences; and 
consistency and proportionality. 
 
Implications for RJ practice 
As earlier stated, RJ conferencing when used post-conviction as an alternative sentencing 
mechanism is the focus in this paper. Examples of state-run RJ of this kind of model include 
Family Group Conferencing in New Zealand and Youth Conferencing in Northern Ireland. 
Whilst conferencing is used in a number of other jurisdictions on a discretionary basis 
(including in Australia and Europe), these two jurisdictions are unique in that they provide 




Family Group Conferencing was established in New Zealand by what was originally known 
as the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989.57 It was the first legislated 
example of this form of RJ being incorporated into a state’s criminal justice system.58 A 
Family Group Conference (“FGC”) must be held in most types of case, where guilt is 
admitted,59 although participation is voluntary. Participants can include: the young person 
and his or her family; the young person’s advocate; the victim or victim representative; a 
police officer; and the youth justice co-ordinator.60 The model of decision-making intended 
for FGCs is group consensus, with the outcomes “shaped by the families themselves and 
agreed to by all the participants, including the victims”.61 The FGC can make whatever 
recommendations it sees fit, as long as all relevant parties, including the victim and offender 
agree. The plan agreed to during the FGC is binding (as long as it has been accepted by the 
court or prosecuting agency). 
 
The introduction of state-run RJ conferencing in Northern Ireland was heavily 
influenced by FGCs in New Zealand and operates in a similar way. FGCs tend to have more 
focus on the offender and their family; whereas youth conferencing in Northern Ireland tends 
to have a greater emphasis on the needs of the victim. However, in both models, the victim 
and offender can contribute to, and need to agree consensually on, the outcome. Legislative 
backing for youth conferencing in Northern Ireland is provided by the Justice (Northern 
Ireland) Act 200262 and one of the key concerns was to maximise participation in the 




The consensual agreement of the lay participants is not – as will be apparent from the above – 
the end point of the process of sentencing the offender in state-run RJ. There are measures 
put in place which ensure that the state retains substantial control over the process. These 
measures can be divided into those employed during the conference; and those utilised after 
the conference. 
 
During the conference, coordinators/facilitators are encouraged to have input into the 
decision-making process. This might be because criminal justice professionals are viewed as 
having expertise which lay participants do not (for example: how many hours community 
service would be appropriate; or what types of programmes might be available); or because 
they are charged with ensuring proportionality of outcome. In Northern Ireland, the Youth 
Conference Service Practice Manual provides guidance to practitioners and requests that co-
ordinators ensure proportionality in conference outcomes.64 The 2011 Review of the Youth 
Justice System in Northern Ireland further emphasised proportionality,65 and following 
policy changes, co-ordinators were encouraged to ensure that the conference plan was 
proportionate and relevant to the offending.66 The successful implementation of such moves 
to increase focus on proportionality was confirmed in a later report by the Criminal Justice 
Inspection Northern Ireland.67 The effect is to put co-ordinators under more pressure to 
influence the process and place more emphasis on proportionality. 
 
The state can also exercise control during the conference by participants being aware 
that plans need to be ratified before they are finalised. In their evaluation of youth 
conferencing in Northern Ireland, Campbell et al68 identified that awareness of the court or 
prosecutors having to accept the plan might exert some form of coercion on participants:  
 
As plans must be ratified by either the PPS or court, these bodies may be seen as 
exerting an ‘external’ influence. On some occasions, this was explicitly observed 
where conference participants emphasised the importance of devising a plan 
which would satisfy the Magistrate. Pressure to come up with a proportionate plan 
can detract from the restorative philosophy of the process, and may result in the 
young person agreeing to something they are not entirely comfortable with. It is 
vital that any plan agreed within a conference is a result of genuine consensus 
amongst conference participants and not as a result of external pressure. 
 
The state’s control over the process is exercised after the conference, by criminal justice 
professionals (the court or the prosecution service) having the final say in whether the 
conference plan is suitable. This is where the influence of the principles of consistency and 
proportionality are most apparent. In both New Zealand and Northern Ireland, the court can 
accept, reject or vary plans69 which are put before them following a RJ conference and 
therefore retain power over the final decision. Lay participants may find that their efforts are 
undermined where the court subsequently varies or even rejects the plan, and may wonder 
whether they really held the decision-making power after all. 
 
Other evaluations support this view. Hoyle and Rosenblatt indicate that little has been 
learned in state-run RJ in the UK over the last 10 years, pointing to problems of professional 
domination and lack of stakeholder involvement (particularly victims): “there has been no 
paradigm shift; indeed there appears to be a lack of imagination for envisaging a significant 
move toward ‘fully’ restorative processes.”70 State-run RJ is incorporated into a state’s 
criminal justice system, funded by the state and involves criminal justice professionals in the 
process. The concern for RJ in this context is that “the goals and values of restorative 
practices will be supplanted by ‘system’ goals and outcomes, such as case-processing targets, 
efficiency and growth.”71 Such “system” goals are best served by the prioritisation of 
consistency and proportionality – values which promise measurability.72 
 
The perceived need for state intervention both during and after RJ conferences has its 
roots in concerns about proportionality and consistency – the idea being that left unchecked, 
lay participants may come up with disproportionate outcomes, and inconsistent outcomes for 
like cases.73 The tendency is therefore to favour these values over empowerment in the trade-
off between empowerment; and consistency and proportionality. A useful tool for 
understanding the level of empowerment that lay participants typically have in state-run RJ is 
to consider Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder of Citizen Participation”,74 which is a useful scale for 
assessing the extent to which people are truly empowered. In the context of RJ, this will not 
always be an easy assessment (although the participants themselves can of course be 
consulted) but it is less complicated than the more abstract notions of consistency and 
proportionality. 
 
Arnstein’s scale has “nonparticipation” at the bottom of the ladder; in the middle is 
“tokenism”, including consultation and placation by the state; and the top is true 
empowerment. The top part of the ladder has three levels of increasing empowerment: 
“partnership”; “delegated power”; and “citizen control”. Current state-run RJ in many cases 
might only achieve “tokenism”, depending on the extent of input from criminal justice 
professionals. 
 
The wider context 
The measures which limit the empowerment of participants, taken by states who have 
implemented RJ, are largely driven by concerns about consistency and proportionality, which 
are well-established and ingrained principles of sentencing. In striking the balance between 
these principles and empowerment in state-run RJ, the state will tend to favour consistency 
and proportionality. 
 
The current social and political climate within which proportionality and consistency 
are being employed is important to note as well. Proportionality is often considered important 
in limiting potential extremes to which participants in RJ conferences might resort.75 Recent 
research, however, casts doubt on this argument: 
 
[I]n our social and political world – a world no longer organised around a 
moral order structured in terms of symbolically anchored notions of desert 
or appropriateness – there is no agreed mechanism for anchoring the 
penalty scale according to cardinal proportionality … Particularly under 
conditions of a highly politicised climate for criminal justice policy-
making, the commitment to just deserts all too easily produces insatiable 
demands for hard treatment. 76 
 
This is reflected in the rising rates of imprisonment in England and Wales77 and the US78 
which has coincided with an increasing focus on proportionality and consistency over the last 
quarter of a century.79 The effectiveness of proportionality as a limiting mechanism is 
therefore questionable,80 and – as Lacey and Pickard point out, proportionality could 
currently be viewed as a tool for increasing punitiveness. This has also been suggested of 
grid sentencing and its promise of consistency, which has been criticised for leading to 
“needlessly harsh sentences”.81 
 
This weakens the argument that proportionality restrictions are necessary in RJ to 
limit excessive punishments – indeed, it suggests these may not operate as restrictions at all. 
Braithwaite’s assessment of the empirical evidence about RJ practice appears to support this: 
 
the empirical evidence of the courts intervening to overturn the decisions of 
restorative justice processes, which has now been considerable … has been 
overwhelmingly in the direction of the courts increasing the punitiveness of 
agreements reached between victims, offenders and other stakeholders.82 
 
This undermines the idea that the proportionality principle is essential in RJ to limit excessive 
punitive impulses by participants. Rather, it suggests that where proportionality is applied to 
RJ, it is used to increase, not limit, sentences (as seen in Clotworthy – discussed above). This 
suggests RJ participants tend to be less punitive than the courts, as discussed above in relation 
to the benefits of empowerment.83  
 
Together with the problems outlined earlier, this should counsel those who wish to see 
the maximally effective implementation of RJ away from strict allegiance to consistency and 
proportionality. This requires a different, less intrusive role to be assumed by the state. A 
detailed discussion of precisely what the state’s role should be in the process is outside the 
scope of this paper, but it is worth briefly highlighting one promising reconceptualisation of 
the role of the state in RJ, which has been put forward by Roche,84 which moves away from 
the state as guardian of consistency and proportionality in outcomes. He suggests that the 
state should instead have an administrative function, ensuring the fairness of the process.85 
The state’s public function is reimagined as being to facilitate the consensual resolution of 
offences (where possible) and ensure fairness in the process of doing so. In terms of the 
trade-off, Roche’s model would allow a balance more in favour of empowerment. 
 
The oversight provided by the system of review recommended by Roche, would 
safeguard participants by checking that decisions were truly consensual (meaning participants 
considered the outcome fair). The state would only intervene where there was a procedural 
error, for example where power imbalances were identified, such as one participant being 
dominated by another. Alongside this, any decision reached would need to be within the 
bounds of responses that the state could provide, to align with the capabilities and resources 
of the criminal justice system. The checks and balances provided by the administrative role of 
judges, promoting procedural fairness, would ensure high standards are maintained, without 
unnecessary interference with the participants’ decision-making. This links with the 
substantial research available on the importance of procedural fairness, particularly in relation 
to promoting legitimacy and engendering support for outcomes: 
 
the primary factor that people consider when they are deciding whether 
they feel a decision is legitimate and ought to be accepted is whether or not 
they believe that the authorities involved made their decision through a fair 
procedure … Research clearly shows that procedural justice matters more 
than whether or not people agree with a decision or regard it as 
substantively fair.86 
 
This is a different interpretation of fairness, focused on the procedural aspect, and a 
different positioning of considerations of proportionality and consistency. Instead of trying to 
align different RJ conferences with each other in terms of content and outcomes, consistency 
and fairness of approach in how the conferences are run is the focus. For example: ensuring 
no one party dominates; ensuring facilitators are appropriately trained; ensuring equal access 
to RJ; and perhaps also consistently maximising empowerment, by ensuring stakeholders 
have adequate opportunity to air their views and take part in decision-making. 
 
Conclusion  
Empowerment is at the heart of RJ and its benefits,87 which include increased victim 
satisfaction and reduced offender recidivism. Currently, it is undermined in state-run RJ by 
the trade-off (outlined above) favouring the pursuit of proportionality and consistency. 
However, these are problematic principles. They rely on the establishment of equivalences 
which are, if not arbitrary, at least contestable88  and both require a level of knowledge that 
sentencers will never attain in practice. 
 
 The problem is the unclear grounding for value judgments, together with the pretence 
of objectivity: proportionality and consistency are often treated as if they do not involve 
substantial and contestable value judgments. This is problematic, as such subjectivity, 
especially where unexamined or hidden, enables prejudices to be smuggled into the decision-
making process. RJ also involves value judgments in the decision-making process, but there 
is a clear genealogy of where such judgments come from (the stakeholders) and a rationale 
for why they should emanate from that source: they are most affected by the offence. 
 
Acknowledgement of the problems with consistency and proportionality is important, 
as is acknowledgement of the existence of the trade-off: the fact that in RJ, current methods 
of attempting to increase consistency and proportionality come at the expense of 
empowerment, a fundamental benefit of RJ. There is therefore an increased need for revised 
thinking on consistency and proportionality in the context of RJ. Proper consideration of the 
problems with these principles shows that they are not the ideal principles they are commonly 
portrayed as when considered in relation to empowerment in RJ. 
 
The idea that consistency and proportionality are somehow necessary to fairness89 
and the associated assumption of the primacy and unimpeachable nature of these principles 
are untenable positions once the problems with them are acknowledged. Empowering RJ 
offers a different but well-rounded vision of fairness. This is true both in the narrow context 
of what it means to those most affected by the offending behaviour (the particular 
manifestation of fairness thereby being connected to individuals with a real stake in that 
offence) and in the broader context of public perceptions of fairness, which RJ promotes by 
pursuing high standards of procedural justice. The trade-off should therefore be made more in 
favour of empowerment. 
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